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Torts - Release of Joint Tortfeasors
TORTS - RELEASE OF JOINT TORTFEASORS - APPLICABILITY
TO ALLEGED BREACH OF EIPLIED WARRANTY
Clark v. Zimmer Manufacturing Company, 290 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961)
In Clark v. Zimmer Manufacturing Company1 the plaintiff suffered
a compound fracture of his right femur due to the negligence of an
original tortfeasor. During treatment, a surgical nail was inserted within
the plaintiff's femur. The defendant-manufacturer of the nail allegedly
had imply warranted that the nail was suited for the known purpose
for which it was to be used. Less than one month after insertion
the nail snapped or broke within the plaintiff's femur. Nearly three
months after this occurrence the plaintiff discharged his claim and cause
of action against the original tortfeasor by a written release. The
plaintiff then brought an action against the manufacturer, on the theory
of negligence in the manufacturing of the nail, to recover for injuries
sustained when the nail broke.
On appeal from a judgment which granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment based on the release of the original tortfeasor,
the lower court's decision was affirmed. Thus, the plaintiff's release of
his cause of action against the original tortfeasor served to release his
cause of action against the manufacturer for the alleged breach of the
implied warranty of fitness.
The general common-law rule is that a release of one of several joint
tortfeasors releases all from liability But much judicial confusion has
resulted from the application of this rule.' In cases similar to the Clark
case, involving subsequent injuries due to an original negligent act, some
courts have applied the common-law rule by considering the injuries as
a single injury based on tests of "proximate cause." Thus, these courts
have held that the contributors to the so-called "single injury" are dis-
missed under the terms of a release.4 Apparently other courts, dissatisfied
1. 290 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961).
2. Laznovsky v. Furdanowicz, 22 Conn. Supp. 297, 170 A.2d 734 (Super. Ct. 1961); Aldrich
v. Parnell, 147 Mass. 409, 18 N.E. 170 (1888). See PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
The rule is said to have had its origin in Cocke v. Jennor, Hob. 160, 80 Eng. Rep. 214
(K.B. 1614). In that case, the plaintiff had been assaulted by Jennor and Milbourne. The
plaintiff released Milbourne and sued Jennor. The court denied recovery, stating: ".... a
release to one dischargeth the whole trespass; and also a release is as good a satisfaction in law,
as a satisfaction in deed .. " at Hob. 160, 80 Eng. Rep. at 215.
See Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958), for a discussion of the rule, its
development, and its subsequent modification.
3. See generally, Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L REV. 413 (1937).
See also, e.g., City of Buford v. Hosch, 104 Ga. App. 615, 122 S.E.2d 287 (1961); Aldrich
v. Parnell, 147 Mass. 409, 18 N.E. 170 (1888).
4. This is particularly true in medical malpractice situations. Generally, it is recognized
that a release of one responsible for an injury prevents recovery from a physician for his
negligent treatment of the injury. See Annot., 40 ALR.2d 1075 (1955). The two asserted
theories upon which the release of the physician is granted are: (1) the judicial presumption
that the original injuries are the proximate cause of the added injuries and were included in
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with this rule and its application, have sought to avoid its harshness by
adopting "escape devices" to the rule.5 But new terms and definitions
have only clouded the issue and have been somewhat unsatisfactory be-
cause of the resultant contradictory views and wide divergence in their
application.6
One origin of this confusion appears to be the failure of some courts
to recognize that the common-law rule of "unity of discharge," which
refers to the release of all parties related to the injury, is based on the
concept of "unity of a cause of action" against the joint tortfeasors.7 This
means that the common-law rule, in its original rigid application, could
release only those parties to a single injury resulting from a single tort.
The determinative question, therefore, ought to be whether the entire
cause of action, and not merely one of the tortfeasors, has been released.8
The rationale for the rule releasing one joint tortfeasor upon the
release of the others is said to be that a person is entitled to only one
compensation for his injury and that the rule is intended to prevent a
double recovery by the injured party.9 It is encouraging to note that
the trend of the courts today, in the absence of statute, is to examine
the intention of the releasor and not to permit a cursory dismissal of a
plaintiff's cause of action."0 However, conflict exists under the "inten-
tion of the parties" test in ascertaining the extent of a given release.
This diversity of opinion arises in judicial reasoning when courts consider
whether a given release is a manifestation of the intent of the parties."
the action against the original tortfeasor; and (2) the "but for" test, which is that the mal-
practice would not have occurred but for the original injury, and that the subsequent mal-
practice was the proximate result of the original injury. Compare Ash v. Mortenson, 24 Cal.
2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944), with Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 At. 107 (1937).
5. Some of the terms which courts have used to avoid the common-law rule are "indepen-
dent," "concurring," ".successive," or "subsequent." By distinguishing tortfeasors with these
terms, courts have held that such tortfeasors are not within the rule and, hence, are not released.
See Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
6. Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
7. Ash v. Mortenson, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944).
8. In Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 488, 239 N.W. 223, 224 (1931), the court passed
on the question of the release of the cause of action by stating: "The decisive thing now is
not whether plaintiff actually released this defendant, or intended to do so, or got full com-
pensation, but rather and only whether she has discharged her whole cause of action ....
The destruction of it is the primary result from which follows necessarily the secondary one
of releasing all the wrongdoers, whether their wrongs were concurrent or successive. The
entire cause of action being gone, no one can remain liable."
9. Lamoreux v. San Diego & Arizona . Ry., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 311 P.2d 1 (1957).
10. Eagle Lion Films, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 219 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1955); McKenna v.
Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958).
See also Annot., 73 A.L.RI2d 403 (1960).
11. This conflict is pointed out in the majority and dissenting opinions in Hasselrode v.
Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961). This case arose on appeal to determine the
construction and interpretation of a release. The plaintiff was injured as a passenger in an
auto driven by Carnegie which collided with the defendant's truck. The plaintiff released
Carnegie. The majority held that the release was effective to release the defendant even
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In the Clark case, the court purportedly used the following reason-
ing: if the original tortfeasor could have been liable for the subsequent
injury because it was the natural and probable consequence of his negli-
gence,"2 his release will also serve to release the defendant nail manu-
facturer. The court, citing Massachusetts' tort law,'" said:
We believe that it cannot be said as a matter of law that the fracture
of the nail was a completely new injury for which the original tort-
feasor would be in no way responsible.' 4
In essence, the court applied the general rule of malpractice situations "
and affirmed the judgment for the defendant solely on considerations of
proximate cause. Had the court looked to the intent of the releasor, the
result might have been different.'"
The court's holding in the instant case is undesirable in two respects:
(1) it does not make allowance for a determination of the releasor's
intent, and (2) it discourages a plaintiff from compromising with one
of the joint tortfeasors while seeking a settlement out of court. The
decision does point out, however, that utmost care should be taken when
considering a release of a negligent party. If such care is not taken, the
scope of the release may extend beyond that actually intended by the
releasor.
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though the defendant did not learn of the release until Carnegie was joined as a party defen-
dant to the suit.
A somewhat humorous, yet caustic, dissent was rendered by Justice Musmanno who put
great emphasis on the fact that the release was on a printed form, leaving blank only the
date and name of the party to be released. Id. at 553, 172 A.2d at 765. While the majority
determined the intent of the parties from the expressed wording of the release, the dissent
admonished the defendant by saying: "It [defendant company] seeks to take advantage of
some stray words in the release which have no more relation to the defendant than the hiero-
glyphics on some prehistoric sarcophagus buried in the subterranean depths of Egypt." Id.
at 556, 172 A.2d at 767.
12. 290 F.2d 849, 851 (1st Cir.'1961).
13. See Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass. 383, 160 N.E. 269 (1928); Purchase v. Seelye,
231 Mass. 434, 121 N.E. 413 (1918). Significantly, both of these cases involved malprac-
tice actions for injuries resulting from allegedly unskillful practice.
14. 290 F.2d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1961).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. Compare the release in the Clark case, 290 F.2d 849, 850 (1961), with the release in
the Hasselrode case, 404 Pa. 549, 550-51, 172 A.2d 764, 764 (1961), and note the similarity.
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